ON REVENUES

By Xenophon

Translation by H. G. Dakyns




        Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a
        pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,
        and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land
        and property in Scillus, where he lived for many
        years before having to move once more, to settle
        in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.

        Revenues describes Xenophon's ideas to solve the
        problem of poverty in Athens, and thus remove an
        excuse to mistreat the Athenian allies.




    PREPARER'S NOTE

    This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a
    four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though
    there is doubt about some of these) is:

    Work                                   Number of books

    The Anabasis                                         7
    The Hellenica                                        7
    The Cyropaedia                                       8
    The Memorabilia                                      4
    The Symposium                                        1
    The Economist                                        1
    On Horsemanship                                      1
    The Sportsman                                        1
    The Cavalry General                                  1
    The Apology                                          1
    On Revenues                                          1
    The Hiero                                            1
    The Agesilaus                                        1
    The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians   2

    Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into
    English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The
    diacritical marks have been lost.




WAYS AND MEANS

A Pamphlet On Revenues



I

For myself I hold to the opinion that the qualities of the leading
statesmen in a state, whatever they be, are reproduced in the character
of the constitution itself. (1)

 (1) "Like minister, like government." For the same idea more fully
    expressed, see "Cyrop." VIII. i. 8; viii. 5.

As, however, it has been maintained by certain leading statesmen in
Athens that the recognised standard of right and wrong is as high at
Athens as elsewhere, but that, owing to the pressure of poverty on the
masses, a certain measure of injustice in their dealing with the allied
states (2) could not be avoided; I set myself to discover whether by
any manner of means it were possible for the citizens of Athens to be
supported solely from the soil of Attica itself, which was obviously
the most equitable solution. For if so, herein lay, as I believed, the
antidote at once to their own poverty and to the feeling of suspicion
with which they are regarded by the rest of Hellas.

 (2) Lit. "the cities," i.e. of the alliance, {tas summakhidas}.

I had no sooner begun my investigation than one fact presented itself
clearly to my mind, which is that the country itself is made by nature
to provide the amplest resources. And with a view to establishing the
truth of this initial proposition I will describe the physical features
of Attica.

In the first place, the extraordinary mildness of the climate is proved
by the actual products of the soil. Numerous plants which in many parts
of the world appear as stunted leafless growths are here fruit-bearing.
And as with the soil so with the sea indenting our coasts, the varied
productivity of which is exceptionally great. Again with regard to those
kindly fruits of earth (3) which Providence bestows on man season by
season, one and all they commence earlier and end later in this land.
Nor is the supremacy of Attica shown only in those products which year
after year flourish and grow old, but the land contains treasures of
a more perennial kind. Within its folds lies imbedded by nature an
unstinted store of marble, out of which are chiselled (4) temples and
altars of rarest beauty and the glittering splendour of images sacred
to the gods. This marble, moreover, is an object of desire to many
foreigners, Hellenes and barbarians alike. Then there is land which,
although it yields no fruit to the sower, needs only to be quarried
in order to feed many times more mouths than it could as corn-land.
Doubtless we owe it to a divine dispensation that our land is veined
with silver; if we consider how many neighbouring states lie round us
by land and sea and yet into none of them does a single thinnest vein of
silver penetrate.

 (3) Lit. "those good things which the gods afford in their seasons."

 (4) Or, "arise," or "are fashioned."

Indeed it would be scarcely irrational to maintain that the city of
Athens lies at the navel, not of Hellas merely, but of the habitable
world. So true is it, that the farther we remove from Athens the
greater the extreme of heat or cold to be encountered; or to use another
illustration, the traveller who desires to traverse the confines of
Hellas from end to end will find that, whether he voyages by sea or by
land, he is describing a circle, the centre of which is Athens. (5)

 (5) See "Geog. of Brit. Isles." J. R. and S. A. Green, ch. i. p. 7:
    "London, in fact, is placed at what is very nearly the geometrical
    centre of those masses of land which make up the earth surface of
    the globe, and is thus more than any city of the world the natural
    point of convergence for its different lines of navigation," etc.
    The natural advantages of Boeotia are similarly set forth by
    Ephorus. Cf. Strab. ix. 2, p. 400.

Once more, this land though not literally sea-girt has all the
advantages of an island, being accessible to every wind that blows, and
can invite to its bosom or waft from its shore all products, since it is
peninsular; whilst by land it is the emporium of many markets, as being
a portion of the continent.

Lastly, while the majority of states have barbarian neighbours,
the source of many troubles, Athens has as her next-door neighbours
civilised states which are themselves far remote from the barbarians.



II

All these advantages, to repeat what I have said, may, I believe, be
traced primarily to the soil and position of Attica itself. But these
natural blessings may be added to: in the first place, by a careful
handling of our resident alien (1) population. And, for my part, I can
hardly conceive of a more splendid source of revenue than lies open
in this direction. Here you have a self-supporting class of residents
conferring large benefits upon the state, and instead of receiving
payment (2) themselves, contributing on the contrary to the gain of
the exchequer by the sojourners' tax. (3) Nor, under the term careful
handling, do I demand more than the removal of obligations which, whilst
they confer no benefit on the state, have an air of inflicting various
disabilities on the resident aliens. (4) And I would further relieve
them from the obligation of serving as hoplites side by side with the
citizen proper; since, beside the personal risk, which is great, the
trouble of quitting trades and homesteads is no trifle. (5) Incidentally
the state itself would benefit by this exemption, if the citizens were
more in the habit of campaigning with one another, rather than (6)
shoulder to shoulder with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians
from all quarters of the world, who form the staple of our resident
alien class. Besides the advantage (of so weeding the ranks), (7) it
would add a positive lustre to our city, were it admitted that the
men of Athens, her sons, have reliance on themselves rather than on
foreigners to fight her battles. And further, supposing we offered our
resident aliens a share in various other honourable duties, including
the cavalry service, (8) I shall be surprised if we do not increase
the goodwill of the aliens themselves, whilst at the same time we add
distinctly to the strength and grandeur of our city.

 (1) Lit. "metics" or "metoecs."

 (2) {misthos}, e.g. of the assembly, the senate, and the dicasts.

 (3) The {metoikion}. See Plat. "Laws," 850 B; according to Isaeus, ap.
    Harpocr. s.v., it was 12 drachmae per annum for a male and 6
    drachmae for a female.

 (4) Or, "the class in question." According to Schneider (who cites the
    {atimetos metanastes} of Homer, "Il." ix. 648), the reference is
    not to disabilities in the technical sense, but to humiliating
    duties, such as the {skaphephoria} imposed on the men, or the
    {udriaphoria} and {skiadephoria} imposed on their wives and
    daughters in attendance on the {kanephoroi} at the Panathenaic and
    other festival processions. See Arist. "Eccles." 730 foll.;
    Boeckh, "P. E. A." IV. x. (Eng. tr. G. Cornewall Lewis, p. 538).

 (5) Or, reading {megas men gar o agon, mega de kai to apo ton tekhnon
    kai ton oikeion apienai}, after Zurborg ("Xen. de Reditibus
    Libellus," Berolini, MDCCCLXXVI.), transl. "since it is severe
    enough to enter the arena of war, but all the worse when that
    implies the abandonment of your trade and your domestic concerns."

 (6) Or, "instead of finding themselves brigaded as nowadays with a
    motley crew of Lydians," etc.

 (7) Zurborg, after Cobet, omits the words so rendered.

 (8) See "Hipparch." ix. 3, where Xenophon in almost identical words
    recommends that reform.

In the next place, seeing that there are at present numerous building
sites within the city walls as yet devoid of houses, supposing the state
were to make free grants of such land (9) to foreigners for building
purposes in cases where there could be no doubt as to the respectability
of the applicant, if I am not mistaken, the result of such a measure
will be that a larger number of persons, and of a better class, will be
attracted to Athens as a place of residence.

 (9) Or, "offer the fee simple of such property to."

Lastly, if we could bring ourselves to appoint, as a new government
office, a board of guardians of foreign residents like our Guardians of
Orphans, (10) with special privileges assigned to those guardians who
should show on their books the greatest number of resident aliens--such
a measure would tend to improve the goodwill of the class in question,
and in all probability all people without a city of their own would
aspire to the status of foreign residents in Athens, and so further
increase the revenues of the city. (11)

 (10) "The Archon was the legal protector of all orphans. It was his
    duty to appoint guardians, if none were named in the father's
    will."--C. R. Kennedy, Note to "Select Speeches of Demosthenes."
    The orphans of those who had fallen in the war (Thuc. ii. 46) were
    specially cared for.

 (11) Or, "help to swell the state exchequer."



III

At this point I propose to offer some remarks in proof of the
attractions and advantages of Athens as a centre of commercial
enterprise. In the first place, it will hardly be denied that we possess
the finest and safest harbourage for shipping, where vessels of all
sorts can come to moorings and be laid up in absolute security (1) as
far as stress of weather is concerned. But further than that, in most
states the trader is under the necessity of lading his vessel with some
merchandise (2) or other in exchange for his cargo, since the current
coin (3) has no circulation beyond the frontier. But at Athens he has a
choice: he can either in return for his wares export a variety of goods,
such as human beings seek after, or, if he does not desire to take goods
in exchange for goods, he has simply to export silver, and he cannot
have a more excellent freight to export, since wherever he likes to sell
it he may look to realise a large percentage on his capital. (4)

 (1) Reading {adeos} after Cobet, or if {edeos}, transl. "in perfect
    comfort."

 (2) Or, "of exchanging cargo for cargo to the exclusion of specie."

 (3) I.e. of the particular locality. See "The Types of Greek Coins,"
    Percy Gardner, ch. ii. "International Currencies among the
    Greeks."

 (4) Or, "on the original outlay."

Or again, supposing prizes (5) were offered to the magistrates in charge
of the market (6) for equitable and speedy settlements of points in
dispute (7) to enable any one so wishing to proceed on his voyage
without hindrance, the result would be that far more traders would trade
with us and with greater satisfaction.

 (5) Cf. "Hiero," ix. 6, 7, 11; "Hipparch." i. 26.

 (6) {to tou emporiou arkhe}. Probably he is referring to the
    {epimeletai emporiou} (overseers of the market). See Harpocr.
    s.v.; Aristot. "Athenian Polity," 51.

 (7) For the sort of case, see Demosth. (or Deinarch.) "c. Theocr."
    1324; Zurborg ad loc.; Boeckh, I. ix. xv. (pp. 48, 81, Eng. tr.)

It would indeed be a good and noble institution to pay special marks
of honour, such as the privilege of the front seat, to merchants and
shipowners, and on occasion to invite to hospitable entertainment those
who, through something notable in the quality of ship or merchandise,
may claim to have done the state a service. The recipients of these
honours will rush into our arms as friends, not only under the incentive
of gain, but of distinction also.

Now the greater the number of people attracted to Athens either as
visitors or as residents, clearly the greater the development of imports
and exports. More goods will be sent out of the country, (8) there will
be more buying and selling, with a consequent influx of money in
the shape of rents to individuals and dues and customs to the state
exchequer. And to secure this augmentation of the revenues, mind you,
not the outlay of one single penny; nothing needed beyond one or two
philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision. (9)

 (8) See Zurborg, "Comm." p. 24.

 (9) See Aristot. "Pol." iv. 15, 3.

With regard to the other sources of revenue which I contemplate, I
admit, it is different. For these I recognise the necessity of a capital
(10) to begin with. I am not, however, without good hope that the
citizens of this state will contribute heartily to such an object, when
I reflect on the large sums subscribed by the state on various late
occasions, as, for instance, when reinforcements were sent to the
Arcadians under the command of Lysistratus, (11) and again at the date
of the generalship of Hegesileos. (12) I am well aware that ships of
war are frequently despatched and that too (13) although it is uncertain
whether the venture will be for the better or for the worse, and
the only certainty is that the contributor will not recover the sum
subscribed nor have any further share in the object for which he gave
his contribution. (14)

 (10) "A starting-point."

 (11) B.C. 366; cf. "Hell." VII. iv. 3.

 (12) B.C. 362; cf. "Hell." VII. v. 15. See Grote, "H. G." x. 459;
    Ephor. ap. Diog. Laert. ii. 54; Diod. Sic. xv. 84; Boeckh, ap. L.
    Dindorf. Xenophon's son Gryllus served under him and was slain.

 (13) Reading {kai tauta toutout men adelou ontos}, after Zurborg.

 (14) Reading { (uper) on an eisenegkosi} with Zurborg. See his note,
    "Comm." p. 25.

But for a sound investment (15) I know of nothing comparable with
the initial outlay to form this fund. (16) Any one whose contribution
amounts to ten minae (17) may look forward to a return as high as he
would get on bottomry, of nearly one-fifth, (18) as the recipient of
three obols a day. The contributor of five minae (19) will on the same
principle get more than a third, (20) while the majority of Athenians
will get more than cent per cent on their contribution. That is to say,
a subscription of one mina (21) will put the subscriber in possession
of nearly double that sum, (22) and that, moreover, without setting
foot outside Athens, which, as far as human affairs go, is as sound and
durable a security as possible.

 (15) "A good substantial property."

 (16) Or, "on the other hand, I affirm that the outlay necessary to
    form the capital for my present project will be more remunerative
    than any other that can be named." As to the scheme itself see
    Grote, "Plato," III. ch. xxxix.; Boeckh, op. cit. (pp. 4, 37, 136,
    600 seq. Eng. tr.) Cf. Demosth. "de Sym." for another scheme, 354
    B.C., which shows the "sound administrative and practical
    judgment" of the youthful orator as compared with "the benevolent
    dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges."
    --Grote, op. cit. p. 601.

 (17) L40:12:4 = 1000 drachmae.

 (18) I.e. exactly 18 or nearly 20 per cent. The following table will
    make the arithmetic clear:--

        6 ob. = 1 drachma           10 minae = 6000 ob.
      100 dr. = 1 mina                       = 1000 dr.

      600 ob. = 1 mina   1000 dr.:180 dr.::100:18 therefore nearly 1/5
    3 ob. (a day) x 360 = 1080 ob. p.a.      = nearly 20 per cent.
                        =  180 dr. p.a.

    As to the 3 obols a day (= 180 dr. p.a.) which as an Athenian
    citizen he is entitled to, see Grote, op. cit. p. 597: "There will
    be a regular distribution among all citizens, per head and
    equally. Three oboli, or half a drachma, will be allotted daily to
    each, to poor and rich alike"  (on the principle of the Theorikon).
    "For the poor citizens this will provide a comfortable
    subsistence, without any contribution on their part; the poverty
    now prevailing will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor,
    receive the daily triobolon as a free gift; but if they compute it
    as interest for their investments, they will find that the rate of
    interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry."
    Zurborg, "Comm." p. 25; Boeckh, op. cit. IV. xxi. (p. 606, Eng.
    tr.); and Grote's note, op. cit. p. 598.

 (19) = L20:6:3 = 500 drachmae.

 (20) = I.e. 36 per cent.

 (21) = L4:1:3 = 100 drachmae.

 (22) I.e. 180 per cent.

Moreover, I am of opinion that if the names of contributors were to be
inscribed as benefactors for all time, many foreigners would be induced
to contribute, and possibly not a few states, in their desire to obtain
the right of inscription; indeed I anticipate that some kings, (23)
tyrants, (24) and satraps will display a keen desire to share in such a
favour.

 (23) Zurborg suggests (p. 5) "Philip or Cersobleptes." Cf. Isocr. "On
    the Peace," S. 23.

 (24) I.e. despotic monarchs.

To come to the point. Were such a capital once furnished, it would be a
magnificent plan to build lodging-houses for the benefit of shipmasters
in the neighbourhood of the harbours, in addition to those which
exist; and again, on the same principle, suitable places of meeting for
merchants, for the purposes (25) of buying and selling; and thirdly,
public lodging-houses for persons visiting the city. Again, supposing
dwelling-houses and stores for vending goods were fitted up for retail
dealers in Piraeus and the city, they would at once be an ornament to
the state and a fertile source of revenue. Also it seems to me it would
be a good thing to try and see if, on the principle on which at present
the state possesses public warships, it would not be possible to secure
public merchant vessels, to be let out on the security of guarantors
just like any other public property. If the plan were found feasible
this public merchant navy would be a large source of extra revenue.

 (25) Reading, with Zurborg, {epi one te}.



IV

I come to a new topic. I am persuaded that the establishment of the
silver mines on a proper footing (1) would be followed by a large
increase in wealth apart from the other sources of revenue. And I would
like, for the benefit of those who may be ignorant, to point out what
the capacity of these mines really is. You will then be in a position
to decide how to turn them to better account. It is clear, I presume,
to every one that these mines have for a very long time been in active
operation; at any rate no one will venture to fix the date at which they
first began to be worked. (2) Now in spite of the fact that the silver
ore has been dug and carried out for so long a time, I would ask you to
note that the mounds of rubbish so shovelled out are but a fractional
portion of the series of hillocks containing veins of silver, and as
yet unquarried. Nor is the silver-bearing region gradually becoming
circumscribed. On the contrary it is evidently extending in wider area
from year to year. That is to say, during the period in which thousands
of workers (3) have been employed within the mines no hand was ever
stopped for want of work to do. Rather, at any given moment, the work to
be done was more than enough for the hands employed. And so it is
to-day with the owners of slaves working in the mines; no one dreams
of reducing the number of his hands. On the contrary, the object is
perpetually to acquire as many additional hands as the owner possibly
can. The fact is that with few hands to dig and search, the find of
treasure will be small, but with an increase in labour the discovery of
the ore itself is more than proportionally increased. So much so, that
of all operations with which I am acquainted, this is the only one
in which no sort of jealousy is felt at a further development of the
industry. (4) I may go a step farther; every proprietor of a farm will
be able to tell you exactly how many yoke of oxen are sufficient for the
estate, and how many farm hands. To send into the field more than the
exact number requisite every farmer would consider a dead loss. (5) But
in silver mining (operations) the universal complaint is the want of
hands. Indeed there is no analogy between this and other industries.
With an increase in the number of bronze-workers articles of bronze may
become so cheap that the bronze-worker has to retire from the field. And
so again with ironfounders. Or again, in a plethoric condition of the
corn and wine market these fruits of the soil will be so depreciated in
value that the particular husbandries cease to be remunerative, and many
a farmer will give up his tillage of the soil and betake himself to the
business of a merchant, or of a shopkeeper, to banking or money-lending.
But the converse is the case in the working of silver; there the larger
the quantity of ore discovered and the greater the amount of silver
extracted, the greater the number of persons ready to engage in the
operation. One more illustration: take the case of movable property. No
one when he has got sufficient furniture for his house dreams of making
further purchases on this head, but of silver no one ever yet possessed
so much that he was forced to cry "enough." On the contrary, if ever
anybody does become possessed of an immoderate amount he finds as much
pleasure in digging a hole in the ground and hoarding it as in the
actual employment of it. And from a wider point of view: when a state is
prosperous there is nothing which people so much desire as silver.
The men want money to expend on beautiful armour and fine horses, and
houses, and sumptuous paraphernalia (6) of all sorts. The women betake
themselves to expensive apparel and ornaments of gold. Or when states
are sick, (7) either through barrenness of corn and other fruits, or
through war, the demand for current coin is even more imperative (whilst
the ground lies unproductive), to pay for necessaries or military aid.

 (1) Or, "on a sound basis."

 (2) "Exploited."

 (3) Or, "at the date when the maximum of hands was employed."

 (4) Reading {epikataskeuazumenois}, or, if {episkeuazomenoi}, transl.
    "at the rehabilitation of old works."

 (5) Cf. "Oecon." xvii. 12.

 (6) "The thousand and one embellishments of civil life."

 (7) "When a state is struck down with barrenness," etc. See "Mem." II.
    vii.

And if it be asserted that gold is after all just as useful as silver,
without gainsaying the proposition I may note this fact (8) about gold,
that, with a sudden influx of this metal, it is the gold itself which
is depreciated whilst causing at the same time a rise in the value of
silver.

 (8) Lit. "I know, however."

The above facts are, I think, conclusive. They encourage us not only to
introduce as much human labour as possible into the mines, but to extend
the scale of operations within, by increase of plant, etc., in full
assurance that there is no danger either of the ore itself being
exhausted or of silver becoming depreciated. And in advancing these
views I am merely following a precedent set me by the state herself. So
it seems to me, since the state permits any foreigner who desires it to
undertake mining operations on a footing of equality (9) with her own
citizens.

 (9) Or, "at an equal rent with that which she imposes on her own
    citizens." See Boeckh, "P. E. A." IV. x. (p. 540, Eng. tr.)

But, to make my meaning clearer on the question of maintenance, I will
at this point explain in detail how the silver mines may be furnished
and extended so as to render them much more useful to the state. Only I
would premise that I claim no sort of admiration for anything which I am
about to say, as though I had hit upon some recondite discovery. Since
half of what I have to say is at the present moment still patent to the
eyes of all of us, and as to what belongs to past history, if we are to
believe the testimony of our fathers, (10) things were then much of a
piece with what is going on now. No, what is really marvellous is that
the state, with the fact of so many private persons growing wealthy
at her expense, and under her very eyes, should have failed to imitate
them. It is an old story, trite enough to those of us who have cared to
attend to it, how once on a time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, owned
a thousand men in the silver mines, (11) whom he let out to Sosias, a
Thracian, on the following terms. Sosias was to pay him a net obol a
day, without charge or deduction, for every slave of the thousand,
and be (12) responsible for keeping up the number perpetually at that
figure. So again Hipponicus (13) had six hundred slaves let out on
the same principle, which brought him in a net mina (14) a day without
charge or deduction. Then there was Philemonides, with three hundred,
bringing him in half a mina, and others, I make no doubt there were,
making profits in proportion to their respective resources and capital.
(15) But there is no need to revert to ancient history. At the present
moment there are hundreds of human beings in the mines let out on
the same principle. (16) And given that my proposal were carried into
effect, the only novelty in it is that, just as the individual in
acquiring the ownership of a gang of slaves finds himself at once
provided with a permanent source of income, so the state, in like
fashion, should possess herself of a body of public slaves, to the
number, say, of three for every Athenian citizen. (17) As to the
feasibility of our proposals, I challenge any one whom it may concern to
test the scheme point by point, and to give his verdict.

 (10) Reading {para ton pateron}, with Zurborg, after Wilamowitz-
    Mollendorf.

 (11) See "Mem." II. v. 2; Plut. "Nicias," 4; "Athen." vi. 272. See an
    important criticism of Boeckh's view by Cornewall Lewis,
    translation of "P. E. A." p. 675 foll.

 (12) Reading {parekhein}, or if {pareikhen}, transl. "whilst he
    himself kept up the number." See H. hagen in "Journ. Philol." x.
    19, pp. 34-36; also Zurborg, "Comm." p. 28.

 (13) Son of Callias.

 (14) = L4:1:3 = 600 ob.

 (15) Or, "whose incomes would vary in proportion to their working
    capital."

 (16) See Jebb, "Theophr." xxvi. 21.

 (17) According to the ancient authorities the citizens of Athens
    numbered about 21,000 at this date, which would give about 63,000
    as the number of state-slaves contemplated for the purposes of the
    scheme. See Zurborg, "Comm." p. 29. "At a census taken in B.C. 309
    the number of slaves was returned at 400,000, and it does not seem
    likely that there were fewer at any time during the classical
    period."--"A Companion to School Classics" (James Gow), p. 101,
    xiii. "Population of Attica."

With regard to the price then of the men themselves, it is obvious that
the public treasury is in a better position to provide funds than any
private individuals. What can be easier than for the Council (18) to
invite by public proclamation all whom it may concern to bring their
slaves, and to buy up those produced? Assuming the purchase to be
effected, is it credible that people will hesitate to hire from the
state rather than from the private owner, and actually on the same
terms? People have at all events no hesitation at present in hiring
consecrated grounds, sacred victims, (19) houses, etc., or in purchasing
the right of farming taxes from the state. To ensure the preservation
of the purchased property, the treasury can take the same securities
precisely from the lessee as it does from those who purchase the right
of farming its taxes. Indeed, fraudulent dealing is easier on the part
of the man who has purchased such a right than of the man who hires
slaves. Since it is not easy to see how the exportation (20) of public
money is to be detected, when it differs in no way from private money.
Whereas it will take a clever thief to make off with these slaves,
marked as they will be with the public stamp, and in face of a heavy
penalty attached at once to the sale and exportation of them. Up to
this point then it would appear feasible enough for the state to acquire
property in men and to keep a safe watch over them. (21)

 (18) Or, "senate." See Aristot. "Athen. Pol." for the functions of the
    Boule.

 (19) So Zurborg. See Demosth. "in Mid." 570; Boeckh, "P. E. A." II.
    xii. (p. 212, Eng. tr.) See Arnold's note to "Thuc." iii. 50, 7.

 (20) Or, "diversation," "defalcation."

 (21) Or, "as far as that goes, then, there is nothing apparently to
    prevent the state from acquiring property in slaves, and
    safeguarding the property so acquired."

But with reference to an opposite objection which may present itself
to the mind of some one: what guarantee is there that, along with the
increase in the supply of labourers, there will be a corresponding demand
for their services on the part of contractors? (22) It may be reassuring
to note, first of all, that many of those who have already embarked
on mining operations (23) will be anxious to increase their staff of
labourers by hiring some of these public slaves (remember, they have a
large capital at stake; (24) and again, many of the actual labourers now
engaged are growing old); and secondly, there are many others, Athenians
and foreigners alike, who, though unwilling and indeed incapable
of working physically in the mines, will be glad enough to earn a
livelihood by their wits as superintendents. (25)

 (22) Or, "with this influx (multiplying) of labourers there will be a
    corresponding increase in the demand for labour on the part of the
    lessees."

 (23) Or, "got their mining establishments started."

 (24) Or, "of course they will, considering the amount of fixed capital
    at stake," or, "since they have large resources at their back." I
    have adopted Zurborg's stopping of this sentence.

 (25) See "Mem." II. viii. 1, for an illustrative case.

Let it be granted, however, that at first a nucleus of twelve hundred
slaves is formed. It is hardly too sanguine a supposition that out of
the profits alone, (26) within five or six years this number may be
increased to at least six thousand. Again, out of that number of six
thousand--supposing each slave to being in an obol a day clear of all
expenses--we get a revenue of sixty talents a year. And supposing twenty
talents out of this sum laid out on the purchase of more slaves, there
will be forty talents left for the state to apply to any other purpose
it may find advisable. By the time the round number (27) of ten thousand
is reached the yearly income will amount to a hundred talents.

 (26) "Out of the income so derived."

 (27) Or, "full complement."

As a matter of fact, the state will receive much more than these figures
represent, (28) as any one here will bear me witness who can remember
what the dues (29) derived from slaves realised before the troubles at
Decelea. (30) Testimony to the same effect is borne by the fact, that
in spite of the countless number of human beings employed in the silver
mines within the whole period, (31) the mines present exactly the
same appearance to-day as they did within the recollection of our
forefathers. (32) And once more everything that is taking place to-day
tends to prove that, whatever the number of slaves employed, you will
never have more than the works can easily absorb. The miners find no
limit of depth in sinking shafts or laterally in piercing galleries. To
open cuttings in new directions to-day is just as possible as it was in
former times. In fact no one can take on himself to say whether there is
more ore in the regions already cut into, or in those where the pick has
not yet struck. (33) Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there
is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former times?
The answer is, because the people concerned with the mines are poorer
nowadays. The attempt to restart operations, renew plant, etc., is
of recent date, and any one who ventures to open up a new area runs a
considerable risk. Supposing he hits upon a productive field, he becomes
a rich man, but supposing he draws a blank, he loses the whole of his
outlay; and that is a danger which people of the present time are shy of
facing.

 (28) Or, "a very much larger sum than we have calculated on." Lit.
    "many times over that sum."

 (29) Or, "tax." See below, S. 49; for the whole matter see Thuc. vii.
    27, vi. 91; Xen. "Mem." III. vi. 12, in reference to B.C. 413,
    when Decelea had been fortified. As to the wholesale desertion of
    slaves, "more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, many of
    them artisans," according to Thucydides.

 (30) Or, "the days of Decelea." Lit. "the incidents of Decelea."

 (31) I.e. "of their working since mining began."

 (32) Lit. "are just the same to-day as our forefathers recollected
    them to be in their time."

 (33) Or, "whether the tracts already explored or those not yet opened
    are the more prolific."

It is a difficulty, but it is one on which, I believe, I can offer some
practical advice. I have a plan to suggest which will reduce the risk of
opening up new cuttings to a minimum. (34)

 (34) Or, "I have a plan to make the opening of new cuttings as safe as
    possible."

The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into ten tribes.
Let the state then assign to each of these ten tribes an equal number of
slaves, and let the tribes agree to associate their fortunes and proceed
to open new cuttings. What will happen? Any single tribe hitting upon a
productive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous to
all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of them, hit upon
a lode, clearly these several operations will proportionally be more
remunerative still. That the whole ten will fail is not at all in
accordance with what we should expect from the history of the past. It
is possible, of course, for private persons to combine in the same way,
(35) and share their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you
apprehend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this
principle, will prove a thorn in the side (36) of the private owner, or
the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather like allies
who render each other stronger the more they combine, (37) so in these
silver mines, the greater number of companies at work (38) the larger
the riches they will discover and disinter. (39)

 (35) "To form similar joint-stock companies."

 (36) See "Cyneg." v. 5.

 (37) Or, "deriving strength from combination."

 (38) Co-operators.

 (39) Reading {ekphoresousi}, after Cobet.

This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of the method
by which, with the proper state organisation, every Athenian may be
supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense. Possibly some of
you may be calculating that the capital (40) requisite will be enormous.
They may doubt if a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all
the needs. All I can say is, even so, do not despond. It is not as if it
were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be carried out at
once, or else there is to be no advantage in it at all. On the contrary,
whatever number of houses are erected, or ships are built, or slaves
purchased, etc., these portions will begin to pay at once. In fact,
the bit-by-bit method of proceeding will be more advantageous than a
simultaneous carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent:
if we set about erecting buildings wholesale (41) we shall make a more
expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradually.
Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at once we shall
be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher cost. Whereas, if we
proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves able, (42) we can complete any
well-devised attempt at our leisure, (43) and, in case of any obvious
failure, take warning and not repeat it. Again, if everything were to be
carried out at once, it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision
at our expense. (44) Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part
stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish what is
necessary to go on with. But to come now to what every one probably will
regard as a really grave danger, lest the state may become possessed of
an over large number of slaves, with the result that the works will be
overstocked. That again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are
careful not to put into the works more hands from year to year than
the works themselves demand. Thus (45) I am persuaded that the easiest
method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is also the best. If,
however, you are persuaded that, owing to the extraordinary property
taxes (46) to which you have been subjected during the present war, you
will not be equal to any further contributions at present, (47) what you
should do is this: (48) during the current year resolve to carry on
the financial administration of the state within the limits of a sum
equivalent to that which your dues (49) realised before the peace.
That done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether directly
traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous treatment of
our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth of the imports and
exports, coincident with the collecting together of larger masses of
human beings, or to an augmentation of harbour (50) and market dues:
this surplus, I say, however derived, you should take and invest (51) so
as to bring in the greatest revenue. (52)

 (40) Or, "sinking fund."

 (41) {athrooi}--"in a body." It is a military phrase, I think. In
    close order, as it were, not in detachments.

 (42) "According to our ability," a favourite Socratic phrase.

 (43) {authis}. See for this corrupt passage Zurborg, "Comm." p. 31. He
    would insert, "and a little delay will not be prejudicial to our
    interests, but rather the contrary," or to that effect, thus: {kai
    authis an  (anutoimen ou gar toiaute te anabole blaben genesthai
    an) emin oiometha} "vel simile aliquid."

 (44) Or, "it is we who must bear the whole burthen of the outlay."

 (45) {outos}, "so far, unless I am mistaken, the easiest method is the
    best."

 (46) Or, "heavy contributions, subscriptions incidental to," but the
    word {eisphoras} is technical. For the exhaustion of the treasury
    see Dem. "Lept." 464; Grote, "H. G."xi. 326.

 (47) Or, "you will not be able to subscribe a single penny more."

 (48) {umeis de}, you are masters of the situation. It lies with you to
    carry on, etc.; {dioikeite} is of course imperative.

 (49) Or, "taxes."

 (50) Reading, after Zurborg, {dia ta ellimenia}. Or, if the vulg. {dia
    en limeni}, transl. "an augmentation of market dues at Piraeus."

 (51) I.e. as fixed capital, or, "you should expend on plant."

 (52) Or, adopting Zurborg's emend, {os an pleista eggignetai}, transl.
    "for the purposes of the present scheme as far as it may be
    available."

Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that the whole
scheme (53) will crumble into nothing on the first outbreak of war,
I would only beg these alarmists to note that, under the condition of
things which we propose to bring about, war will have more terrors for
the attacking party than for this state. Since what possession I should
like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of
the many ships which they will be capable of manning on public service.
Think of the number who will serve on land as infantry (in the
public service) and will bear hard upon the enemy. Only we
must treat them with courtesy. (54) For myself, my calculation is, that
even in the event of war we shall be quite able to keep a firm hold of
the silver mines. I may take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the
mines certain fortresses--one on the southern slope in Anaphlystus;
(55) and we have another on the northern side in Thoricus, the two being
about seven and a half miles (56) apart. Suppose then a third breastwork
were to be placed between these, on the highest point of Besa,
that would enable the operatives to collect into one out of all the
fortresses, and at the first perception of a hostile movement it would
only be a short distance for each to retire into safety. (57) In the
event of an enemy advancing in large numbers they might certainly make
off with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But even if
they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little better to them
than a heap of stones. (58) But how is an enemy ever to march upon the
mines in force? The nearest state, Megara, is distant, I take it, a good
deal over sixty miles; (59) and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal
nearer seventy. (60) Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such
point to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens; and presuming
his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihilated by our
cavalry and frontier police. (61) I say, presuming his force to be
small, since to march with anything like a large force, and thereby
leave his own territory denuded of troops, would be a startling
achievement. Why, the fortified city of Athens will be much closer the
states of the attacking parties than they themselves will be by the
time they have got to the mines. But, for the sake of argument, let us
suppose an enemy to have arrived in the neighbourhood of Laurium; how
is he going to stop there without provisions? To go out in search of
supplies with a detachment of his force would imply risk, both for the
foraging party and for those who have to do the fighting; (62) whilst,
if they are driven to do so in force each time, they may call themselves
besiegers, but they will be practically in a state of siege themselves.

 (53) Or, "the proposed organisation."

 (54) See ch. ii. above.

 (55) Or, reading {en te pros mesembrian thalatte}, "on the southern
    Sea." For Anaphlystus see "Hell." I. ii. 1; "Mem." III. v. 25. It
    was Eubulus's deme, the leading statesman at this date.

 (56) Lit. "60 stades."

 (57) The passage {sunekoi t an erga}, etc., is probably corrupt. {Ta
    erga} seems to mean "the operatives;" cf. Latin "operae." Others
    take it of "the works themselves." Possibly it may refer to
    military works connecting the three fortresses named. "There might
    be a system of converging (works or) lines drawn to a single point
    from all the fortresses, and at the first sign of any thing
    hostile," etc.

 (58) I.e. "they might as well try to carry off so many tons of stone."

 (59) Lit. "500 stades."

 (60) Lit. "more than 600 stades."

 (61) The {peripoloi}, or horse patrol to guard the frontier. See Thuc.
    iv. 57, viii. 92; Arist. "Birds,"ii. 76. Young Athenians between
    eighteen and twenty were eligible for the service.

 (62) Or, "for the very object of the contest." The construction is in
    any case unusual. {peri on agonizontai} = {peri touton oi}.
    Zurborg suggests {peri ton agonizomenon}.

But it is not the income (63) derived from the slaves alone to which
we look to help the state towards the effective maintenance of her
citizens, but with the growth and concentration of a thick population in
the mining district various sources of revenue will accrue, whether from
the market at Sunium, or from the various state buildings in connection
with the silver mines, from furnaces and all the rest. Since we must
expect a thickly populated city to spring up here, if organised in the
way proposed, and plots of land will become as valuable to owners out
there as they are to those who possess them in the neighbourhood of the
capital.

 (63) I adopt Zurborg's correction, {prosphora} for {eisphora}, as
    obviously right. See above, iv. 23.

If, at this point, I may assume my proposals to have been carried into
effect, I think I can promise, not only that our city shall be relieved
from a financial strain, but that she shall make a great stride in
orderliness and in tactical organisation, she shall grow in martial
spirit and readiness for war. I anticipate that those who are under
orders to go through gymnastic training will devote themselves with
a new zeal to the details of the training school, now that they will
receive a larger maintenance whilst (64) under the orders of the trainer
in the torch race. So again those on garrison duty in the various
fortresses, those enrolled as peltasts, or again as frontier police to
protect the rural districts, one and all will carry out their respective
duties more ardently when the maintenance (64) appropriate to these
several functions is duly forthcoming.

 (64) I follow Zurborg in omitting {e}. If {e} is to stand, transl.
    "than they get whilst supplied by the gymnasiarch in the torch
    race," or "whilst exercising the office of gymnasiarchs
    themselves." See "Pol. Ath." i. 13.

 (65) "State aid."



V

But now, if it is evident that, in order to get the full benefit of all
these sources of revenue, (1) peace is an indispensable condition--if
that is plain, I say, the question suggests itself, would it not be
worth while to appoint a board to act as guardians of peace? Since no
doubt the election of such a magistracy would enhance the charm of this
city in the eyes of the whole world, and add largely to the number
of our visitors. But if any one is disposed to take the view, that by
adopting a persistent peace policy, (2) this city will be shorn of
her power, that her glory will dwindle and her good name be forgotten
throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, the view so taken by our
friends here (3) is in my poor judgment somewhat unreasonable. For
they are surely the happy states, they, in popular language, are most
fortune-favoured, which endure in peace the longest season. And of all
states Athens is pre-eminently adapted by nature to flourish and wax
strong in peace. The while she abides in peace she cannot fail to
exercise an attractive force on all. From the mariner and the merchant
upwards, all seek her, flocking they come; the wealthy dealers in corn
and wine (4) and oil, the owner of many cattle. And not these only, but
the man who depends upon his wits, whose skill it is to do business and
make gain out of money (5) and its employment. And here another crowd,
artificers of all sorts, artists and artisans, professors of wisdom,
(6) philosophers, and poets, with those who exhibit and popularise their
works. (7) And next a new train of pleasure-seekers, eager to feast on
everything sacred or secular, (8) which may captivate and charm eye and
ear. Or once again, where are all those who seek to effect a rapid sale
or purchase of a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at
Athens?

 (1) Or, "to set these several sources of revenue flowing in full
    stream."

 (2) Cf. "a policy of peace at any price," or, "by persisting for any
    length of time in the enjoyment of peace."

 (3) {kai outoi ge}. The speaker waves his hand to the quarter of the
    house where the anti-peace party is seated.

 (4) After Zurborg, I omit {oukh oi eduoinoi}.

 (5) Reading {kai ap arguriou}, with Zurborg.

 (6) Lit. "Sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. lxvii. note, p. 497.

 (7) E.g. chorus-trainers, musicians, grammarians, rhapsodists, and
    actors.

 (8) Or, "sacred and profane."

But if there is no desire to gainsay these views--only that certain
people, in their wish to recover that headship (9) which was once the
pride of our city, are persuaded that the accomplishment of their hopes
is to be found, not in peace but in war, I beg them to reflect on some
matters of history, and to begin at the beginning, (10) the Median war.
Was it by high-handed violence, or as benefactors of the Hellenes, that
we obtained the headship of the naval forces, and the trusteeship of the
treasury of Hellas? (11) Again, when through the too cruel exercise of
her presidency, as men thought, Athens was deprived of her empire, is it
not the case that even in those days, (12) as soon as we held aloof from
injustice we were once more reinstated by the islanders, of their own
free will, as presidents of the naval force? Nay, did not the very
Thebans, in return for certain benefits, grant to us Athenians
to exercise leadership over them? (13) And at another date the
Lacedaemonans suffered us Athenians to arrange the terms of hegemony
(14) at our discretion, not as driven to such submission, but in
requital of kindly treatment. And to-day, owing to the chaos (15) which
reigns in Hellas, if I mistake not, an opportunity has fallen to this
city of winning back our fellow-Hellenes without pain or peril or
expense of any sort. It is given to us to try and harmonise states
which are at war with one another: it is given to us to reconcile the
differences of rival factions within those states themselves, wherever
existing.

 (9) Lit. "her hegemony for the city," B.C. 476.

 (10) "And first of all."

 (11) See Thuc. i. 96.

 (12) B.C. 378. Second confederacy of Delos. See Grote, "H. G." x. 152.

 (13) B.C. 375. Cf. "Hell." V. iv. 62; Grote, "H. G." x. 139; Isocr.
    "Or." xiv. 20; Diod. Sic. xv. 29.

 (14) B.C. 369 (al. B.C. 368). Cf. "Hell." VII. i. 14.

 (15) See "Hell."VII. v. 27.

Make it but evident that we are minded to preserve the independence (16)
of the Delphic shrine in its primitive integrity, not by joining in
any war but by the moral force of embassies throughout the length and
breadth of Hellas--and I for one shall not be astonished if you find our
brother Hellenes of one sentiment and eager under seal of solemn oaths
(17) to proceed against those, whoever they may be, who shall seek (18)
to step into the place vacated by the Phocians and to occupy the sacred
shrine. Make it but evident that you intend to establish a general
peace by land and sea, and, if I mistake not, your efforts will find
a response in the hearts of all. There is no man but will pray for the
salvation of Athens next to that of his own fatherland.

 (16) "Autonomy."

 (17) See Thuc. v. 18, clause 2 of the Treaty of Peace, B.C. 422-421.

 (18) Reading, with Zurborg, {peironto}. Or, if the vulgate
    {epeironto}, transl. "against those who sought to step."

Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches and
money-making, the state may find war more profitable than peace? If so,
I cannot conceive a better method to decide that question than to allow
the mind to revert (19) to the past history of the state and to note
well the sequence of events. He will discover that in times long gone by
during a period of peace vast wealth was stored up in the acropolis, the
whole of which was lavishly expended during a subsequent period of war.
He will perceive, if he examines closely, that even at the present time
we are suffering from its ill effects. Countless sources of revenue have
failed, or if they have still flowed in, been lavishly expended on a
multiplicity of things. Whereas, (20) now that peace is established by
sea, our revenues have expanded and the citizens of Athens have it in
their power to turn these to account as they like best.

 (19) Reading {epanoskopoin}.

 (20) Or, "But the moment peace has been restored."

But if you turn on me with the question, "Do you really mean that even
in the event of unjust attacks upon our city on the part of any, we
are still resolutely to observe peace towards that offender?" I answer
distinctly, No! But, on the contrary, I maintain that we shall all the
more promptly retaliate on such aggression in proportion as we have done
no wrong to any one ourselves. Since that will be to rob the aggressor
of his allies. (21)

 (21) Reading, after Cobet, {ei medena uparkhoimen adikountes}. Or, if
    the vulgate {ei medena parakhoimen adikounta}, transl. "if we can
    show complete innocence on our own side."



VI

But now, if none of these proposals be impracticable or even difficult
of execution; if rather by giving them effect we may conciliate further
the friendship of Hellas, whilst we strengthen our own administration
and increase our fame; if by the same means the people shall be
provided with the necessaries of life, and our rich men be relieved of
expenditure on war; if with the large surplus to be counted on, we are
in a position to conduct our festivals on an even grander scale than
heretofore, to restore our temples, to rebuild our forts and docks, and
to reinstate in their ancient privileges our priests, our senators, our
magistrates, and our knights--surely it were but reasonable to enter
upon this project speedily, so that we too, even in our own day, may
witness the unclouded dawn of prosperity in store for our city.

But if you are agreed to carry out this plan, there is one further
counsel which I would urge upon you. Send to Dodona and to Delphi, I
would beg you, and consult the will of Heaven whether such a provision
and such a policy on our part be truly to the interest of Athens both
for the present and for the time to come. If the consent of Heaven be
thus obtained, we ought then, I say, to put a further question: whose
special favour among the gods shall we seek to secure with a view to the
happier execution of these measures?

And in accordance with that answer, let us offer a sacrifice of happy
omen to the deities so named, and commence the work; since if these
transactions be so carried out with the will of God, have we not the
right to prognosticate some further advance in the path of political
progress for this whole state?







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